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ABSTRACT   
In multiuser rate allocation in a wireless network, strategic users can bias the rate allocation by misrepresenting their 
bandwidth demands to a base station, leading to an unfair allocation. Game-theoretical approaches have been proposed to 
address the unfair allocation problems caused by the strategic users. However, existing approaches rely on a time-
consuming iterative negotiation process. Besides, they cannot completely prevent unfair allocations caused by 
inconsistent strategic behaviors. To address these problems, we propose a Search Based Pricing Mechanism to reduce the 
communication time and to capture a user's strategic behavior. Our simulation results show that the proposed method 
significantly reduce the communication time as well as converges stably to an optimal allocation.   
Keywords: Wireless Video, Resource Allocation, Distributed Video Transport, Game Theory 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
With the popularity of streaming applications in the Internet, the demand for streaming device over wireless networks is 
increasing. Such demands are being addressed by variety of wireless access technologies such as, cellular, wireless 
LANs (e.g., IEEE 802.11), and wireless MANs (e.g., IEEE 802.16, a.k.a. WiMAX) [1]. A WiMAX system has two 
essential elements: BS (base station) and SS (subscriber station). A BS controls and manages all routine works in the 
network, including bandwidth resource allocation to provide QoS guarantees as well as fairness among users.  
There are several technical challenges to support real-time video transmission over WiMAX. The most important 
problem is the system capacity. The large service area of a WiMAX cell can cover lots of users. Thus, how to serve the 
real-time transmissions of these users without network congestion is a challenging problem. For this reason, we need a 
scheduling algorithm to manage users’ requests to increase network capacity [2][3]. For doing resource allocation, a BS 
needs to collect the utility functions of SSs, which represents the video characteristics of users. In general, the BS does 
not know such private information unless these users actively transmit it to the BS. But the users may not be willing to 
reveal their private information. Such informationally decentralized nature becomes a challenge in designing multiuser 
rate allocation. To address this problem, pricing-based resources allocation approaches were developed [4]. The SSs 
share limited network resources for data delivery. Meanwhile, the resource usage accompanies the price, which is 
decided according to the current resource condition. But these approaches assume that the users are honest to reveal their 
true resource demands and will accept the price. In fact, there can exist strategic users who would try to manipulate the 
resource allocation by misrepresenting their requirements to increase their own benefits. In such cases, the performance 
of the entire wireless network will be degraded considerably because of the strategic behaviors [5].  
In [5], a communication based pricing mechanism (CBPM) was proposed to tackle the problems of informationally 
decentralized nature and strategic users. In CBPM, the Central Spectrum Moderator (CSM) continuously exchanges the 
messages about the pricing and the system resource usages with each user until that every user agrees to the final 
resource allocation/pricing which no user wants to change. Then, the CSM allocates the system resource accordingly. 
CBPM can approach an optimal allocation for multiple SSs without requesting the SSs to reveal their private information. 
It also takes the strategic behavior into consideration to gain fairness. 
Although CBPM can reduce the bandwidth overhead on sending private information while still reaching the optimal 
solution. It, however, still has some problems. First, because CBPM relies on an iterative communicating process, it 
typically takes several iterations of communications to converge to an optimal solution. According to our simulation 
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results, CBPM takes about 20~30 OFDMA frames (i.e., 0.1~0.15 sec) to reach a stable solution. In some extreme cases, 
the CBPM needs more than ten thousand iterations to converge. This unpredictable property is undesirable because SSs 
may not have so much time to wait for the convergence.  Moreover although CBPM can reduce the utilities of strategic 
users, it cannot completely prevent a user from sending fake requests to mislead the final allocation. Especially, it may 
not converge when these strategic users use an inconsistent strategy to request bandwidth. 
This work aims to develop a pricing mechanism to reduce the iteration count, detect the strategic behavior as well as 
mitigate the influence of selfish behavior. We propose a Search-Based Pricing Mechanism (SBPM) for joint uplink and 
downlink resource allocation to better tackle the problems caused by the informationally decentralized nature and the 
strategic behavior. 
2. RELATED WORK 
We first summarize the CBPM approach [5], which is a game-theoretic mechanism for resource allocation in wireless 
multimedia. In CBPM, given rate allocation αi and price τi, the price of bandwidth usages is introduced into the utility of 
user i as follows: 
rec( , ) ( )i i i i i iU Qα τ α τ= +  (1) 
where Ui(⋅,⋅) stands for the utility function and ( )reciQ ⋅  represents the received video quality. 
The objective of CBPM is to allocate resources such that the overall utility is maximized, that is 
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Suppose user i is a strategic user who tries to increase its received video quality by sending a bombast request. With 
CBPM, the actual utility obtained by user i is ii
rec
iQ τα +)( , which can be lower than a normal value since a higher 
negative tax τi will be imposed on user i if the user does not truthfully reveal real bandwidth demands. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Mechanism framework of CBPM [4]. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the flow of parameters exchange between users and BS with CBPM, which can be divided into three 
steps. First, user i send a message (αi,pi) to the BS. Second, after receiving the messages from all users, the BS sends 
back the message ),,( γii dp− to user i. The parameters ip− and id  are calculated by 
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where pi represents the unit price of bandwidth for user i, p-i represents the average unit price of bandwidth for other 
users, and di is the excessive demand of the other users. 
The tax in CBPM is defined as ( , )i it pα τ= − , that is 
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where χ+(α,γ) prevents that αi can be infinite when p-i = 0, therefore we set 
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In each iteration, given the message ),,( γii dp− , user i searches (αi,pi) that maximizes the following utility: 
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This is equivalent to { }rec 0max ( ) ( )i i i i iQ pα α α −− − ×  (6)
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Finally, after the messages are stable, i.e., (α,p) converges, then ],....,,[ 21 Mαααα =  will be the bandwidth allocated to 
each user. 
3. PROPOSED SEARCH-BASED PRICING MECHANISM 
This work aims to develop a new pricing mechanism to reduce the iteration count, detect the strategic behaviors, as 
well as mitigate the influence of strategic behaviors. To do so, we propose a Search-Based Pricing Mechanism (SBPM) 
by redesigning the message exchange process of CBPM so that the new mechanism converges to the optimal solution 
more stably and efficiently. Fig. 2 shows the block diagram of SBPM. In the first phase, SSs and the BS communicate 
with each other to bargain the price/tax of bandwidth iteratively to reach the Nash equilibrium. In the second phase, the 
BS uses the price/tax derived in the first phase to reallocate bandwidth for each downlink flow. Let A denote the set of all 
the allowable bandwidth request messages that are transmitted in the system, that is 
{ }| [0,1], 1,2,...,i iA i Nα α= ∈ =  (8)
fA denotes the proposed allocation function to negotiate the price/tax of bandwidth and αi  represents the bandwidth 
request message of user i, and fA: A → ([0,1]M,RM) maps the request messages to possible allocation (α,τ),with [0,1]M∈α  
and MR∈τ .  
Proc. of SPIE Vol. 7744  774413-3
Downloaded from SPIE Digital Library on 04 Feb 2012 to 140.114.195.186. Terms of Use:  http://spiedl.org/terms
  
 
Fig. 2. Block diagram of SBPM in a WiMAX network. 
The proposed SBPM is divided into five stages: 
Endowment stage 
At this stage, each user is given an initial allocation of bandwidth 0iα , where 0
1
1
N
i
i
α
=
=∑ . This initial value does not 
affect the final result of allocation but it will affect the amount of tax on each user. The BS can simply allocate equal 
initial bandwidth to each SS, i.e., 0 1/i Nα =  for all i, if the BS does not know any information about the utility functions 
of SSs. 
Communication and Compensation stage 
At this stage, the BS offers each SS a price, and then all SSs send their bandwidth request message based on this price 
to maximize their utilities. Meanwhile, the BS will supervise each SS’s request and check whether this request is true or 
bombast. The BS and SSs communicate with each other by repeating the following two steps until the total demand of 
bandwidth equals to the channel capacity. 
Step 1:  
The Request Generator in each SS generates a bandwidth request message αi based on the price parameter pi 
provided by the BS to maximize the utilities of SSs. 
Step 2: 
After receiving requests from SSs, the Selfish Node Detector and Compensator in the BS will check whether the 
request of each SS is true or bombast and then set the discount value for each request message accordingly. 
Subsequently, the Message Generator in the BS checks whether the total bandwidth demand meet the total budget 
based on these requests and discount values and then give a new price to each user accordingly.  
The components of SBPM are elaborated below. Due to space limit, the convergence analysis of SBPM can be found 
in [8]. 
 
Strategic Node Detector and Compensator: 
Although CBPM can reach the optimal solution without requesting users to transmit their private information, 
strategic users may send bombast demands to increase their bandwidth and corrode other users’ benefits. Besides, the 
strategic users usually behave inconsistently which leads to the slow convergence or even divergence of CBPM. A 
questionnaire often contains several similar questions so that if one answers different answers on these similar questions, 
the analysts will recognize that the answers may not be trustable. Based on this concept, we propose to design a pricing 
mechanism that will make the strategic users fluctuate between factualness and falseness so that we can identify the 
strategic users by detecting the inconsistency of requests. To do so, we can graft the tax of a user from (5) onto a cost 
that the user needs to pay for. We propose to graft the taxes onto the downlink quality of the user so that if a strategic 
node intends to increase its uplink video quality by means of sending bombast requests, more tax will be imposed on the 
user as well, thereby sacrificing its downlink visual quality. This can ensure that a user will not gain any benefits from 
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telling lies. Since the mechanism makes strategic users fluctuate between factualness and falseness, we can capture the 
strategic behavior accordingly. 
 
Fig. 3. Block diagram of strategic node detector and compensator. 
Because the channel condition and video data rate typically do not fluctuate significantly in one group-of-pictures 
(GOP) time, the resource allocation results should not change too much as well. This means that each user’s bandwidth 
request in an iteration time should be close to those in recent iterations. The bandwidth request value from a strategic 
user, however, may vary significantly. In other words, when these users intend to request more bandwidth than they 
actually need, their bandwidth request value will suddenly become significantly larger than previous values. 
Our method records from each SS the bandwidth requests in a sliding time window, as shown in Fig. 3. When a user 
sends a new bandwidth demand, the BS compares this value with the minimal value in the time window because this 
minimal value is usually a factual demand. If the growth rate of this new value is greater than a threshold, it is likely that 
the user who sent this demand is a strategic user and this demand is bombast. In this paper, we use the global threshold 
method [9] to adjust the threshold dynamically and then classify the demands. The threshold can be chosen by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, the growth rate can be used as a new discount value to scale down the user’s demand so as to mitigate 
the unfairness caused by the strategic behavior.  
 
Request Generator: 
   At each iteration, user i chooses the bandwidth demand αi that maximizes its own utility Ui(αi,ti) as follows: 
0max ( , ) max{ ( ) ( )} max{ ( ) ( )}
i i i
i i i i i i i i i i iU t Q t Q pα α αα α α α α α= − = − ⋅ − (9)
Global Thresholding Method 
initialize:  select a initial threshold value T 
repeat:  
     1. Separate each user’s demand into two groups G1 and G2 by using threshold T 
       G1: the grow rate of demand ≧ T 
       G2: the grow rate of demand ＜ T 
        
2. Calculate the mean values (μ1, μ2) of G1 and G2 
3. Tnext = 
2
21 μμ +  
until: Tnext-T ε≤ where ε +→ 0
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where Qi(αi) denotes the user’s own rate-distortion function. ti(αi) represent a tax function given by 0( ) ( )i i i it pα α α= ⋅ − . 
It is easy to derive from (9) that if SS i wants to maximize its own utility, it should choose the αi at which point the 
slope of R-D curve equals to p, that is 
( )i i
i
d Q p
d
αα =
 
(10)
where the unit price  p is given by the Message Generator. 
Message Generator: 
The message generator chooses a proper price, p, and send it to each node at each iteration. After receiving the 
bandwidth demand αi, the message generator will calculate the sum of all demands, i.e., 
1
N
i
i
d α
=
=∑  (11)
If d ≦ 1, the message generator will find a new smaller p; otherwise, it will find a new larger p using the bisection search 
algorithm. 
 
Algorithm: Bisection Search 
Initialize : the final price of last allocation: pn–1   ε0 
lower bound min = p n–1 –10 ;  upper bound max = pn-1+10 
repeat 
1. set p = (max+min)/2  and send it to each user 
2. receive αi  from user i’s request generator and calculate d 
3. if d ≦ 1.0 → max = p    
else if d ≧ 1.0  →  min = p 
4. if  max-min <ε& d ≠ 1  → max = 512 , min = 0 
until d =1.0 
 
Note that pn–1 is the unit price for the final allocation. Since the prices of recent allocations should be close, we can 
choose a previous price as an initial guess and do a search around it. When the algorithm converges, αi and taxi(ti) of user 
i are sent to the Downlink Bandwidth Manager. 
Grafting taxes on downlink quality 
The Downlink Bandwidth Manager reallocates each user’s downlink flow bandwidth. The Downlink Bandwidth 
Manager will graft the taxes that were generated at Stage 2 on each user’s downlink quality. User i’s downlink flow is 
from node i. That is, after receiving the αi’ and taxi’(ti’) of each node i, the Downlink Bandwidth Manager will re-
calculate αi’ of node i. 
Operational Flow of Downlink Bandwidth Manager 
1. receive αi’ and taxi’ (ti’) of virtual node i 
2. new quality  q = Qi’ (αi’) – ti’ 
3. new bandwidth  αi’ = Qi-1’(q ) 
Note that αi’, ti’, Qi’(⋅) are bandwidth demand, tax and rate-distortion function of node i, respectively. Step 4 is to 
prevent that the sum of allocated bandwidth become greater or less than the total available bandwidth after the re-
allocation. 
Proc. of SPIE Vol. 7744  774413-6
Downloaded from SPIE Digital Library on 04 Feb 2012 to 140.114.195.186. Terms of Use:  http://spiedl.org/terms
  
Allocation stage 
At this stage, the BS will send the final αi and αi’ to each SS and virtual node, respectively. 
Video transmission stage 
After receiving the αi or αi’ from the BS, the SSs transmit their video stream according to the bandwidth allocations. 
 
The comparison between SBPM and CBPM 
The SBPM and CBPM are both designed for distributed systems. The BS will communicate with each SS and then find 
out the optimum solution. However, when there are strategic users in the system, the SBPM can find a fairer solution and 
converge more quickly than CBPM. 
We compare the differences between SBPM and CBPM for the application of video transport in the rtPS class of 
WiMAX network. 
1. Convergence 
In CBPM, each user calculates the price per resource unit from (7) and sends (pi,αi) to BS. BS will send back the 
corresponding average price announced by the other SS to each user. We can analyze (7) as a fixed point iteration 
function. A fixed point function g(x) can converge in a interval if there exists a positive constant k <1such that 
|g’(x)|≦k＜1 [10]. To simplify the analysis, we re-write (7) as 
( ) 1 ( , , )i i i i
dg p p dα χ α γγ +
⎛ + ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
(12)
and 
| '( ) | |1 |i idg p αγ
+= +  (13)
where (di+αi) is the exceeding bandwidth after last iteration, and γ is the update rates.  When there exists the 
exceeding bandwidth, (di+αi) is negative and the new price decreases to encourage peers request more bandwidth; 
when the bandwidth is insufficient, (di+αi) is positive and the price increases to discourage the bandwidth demands. 
From (13), the update rate γ is an important factor to affect convergence. Small γ turns out that (13) may more than 
1 and the iteration function cannot converge; Large γ can guarantee (13) to converge but with slowly update. For 
the convergence, it is difficult to choose a proper γ without any initial information, such as video rates and available 
bandwidth.  
In SBPM, the convergent rate of bisection search algorithm is bound to 1/2 [10] without the control parameter, 
for example: γ. Furthermore, by using the property that video rates do not abruptly change in a short period, the new 
price is around the last price. Therefore, the search range can be limited in a small interval, and the iteration count 
can be further reduced. For those reasons, SBPM converge more quickly than CBPM. 
  
2. Strategic users prevention 
In CBPM, the strategic user sends the bombast request αbombast to acquire extra bandwidth and that causes the raise 
of (di+αbombast) with (7). The high price pbombast generated by the strategic user is merged into the average price p-i in 
BS and distributed to other non-strategic users. In the next iteration, the p-i of strategic user does not include his/her 
high price pbombast, which generated in the last iteration. The strategic user calculates the new price from the lower  
p-i and pays less tax in the same time. In contrast, the non-strategic users receive the high p-i and increase the tax at 
the same demand level with (6). In order to reduce the tax, the non-strategic users reduce their bandwidth demand, 
so that the overall bandwidth demand decreases and leads the price pi to fall. Finally, the non-strategic users lower 
their bandwidth demands but the strategic user obtains more bandwidth with a lower price. CBPM is not a fair 
resource allocation when the strategic users join the allocation process.   
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In SBPM, the bombast requests αbombast can de detected and scaled down by the growth rates. In (11), the increment 
caused by αbombast is diminished and the average prices of non-strategic users are less affected by the strategic user. 
The non-strategic users need not lower their demands to reduce their taxes. Therefore, the strategic user cannot take 
advantages from SBPM, in addition the resource of non-strategic users are sustained. Hence, SBPM can have fair 
resource allocation results even if there are strategic users. 
 
4. SIMULATION RESULTS 
We used simulator ns2 with the WiMAX module modified from 6. All CIF (352x288) test sequences were encoded 
using the SVC JSVM7.0 coder 7 with a frame rate of 30 fps. The rate allocation is performed per GOP with a GOP size 
of 8 frames. We evaluate the impact of strategic behavior on the performances of CBPM and SBPM, including the 
iteration count, bandwidth usage, and received video quality. The simulation configuration is listed in TABLE I.  
TABLE I.  CONFIGURATION OF SSS USED IN OUR EXPERIMENTS 
SS 
Node 
Upload to 
BS 
Download 
from BS 
SS 
Node 
Upload to 
BS 
Download 
from BS 
SS1 
Coastguard 
 (flow 1) 
Foreman 
 (flow 12) 
SS7 Crew 
(flow 7) 
Coastguard 
 (flow 18) 
SS2 
Crew 
(flow 2) 
Coastguard 
 (flow 13) 
SS8 Foreman 
 (flow 8) 
Mobile 
(flow 19) 
SS3 
Foreman 
(flow 3) 
Mobile 
(flow 14) 
SS9 Mobile 
(flow 9) 
Crew 
(flow 20) 
SS4 
Mobile 
(flow 4) 
Crew 
(flow 15) 
SS10 News 
(flow10) 
News 
(flow 21) 
SS5 
News 
(flow 5) 
News 
(flow 16) 
SS11 
Coastguard 
 (flow 11) 
Foreman 
 (flow 22) 
SS6 
Coastguard 
 (flow 6) 
Foreman 
 (flow 17) 
   
 
Fig. 4 compares the iteration counts required for CBPM and SBPM for different numbers of strategic nodes. In this 
experiment, each strategic node exaggerates its demand by 100%~200% randomly. Fig. 4(a) shows that the average 
iteration count required for CBPM with no strategic node is 16.4, whereas it grows to 18.2 if there is a strategic node. 
The more the number of strategic nodes, the longer the convergence time to a stable solution. However, the average 
iteration count of SBPM with a strategic node is only about 3.5, almost as few as that of SBPM with no strategic node. 
Even though more strategic nodes are involved, the convergence speed of SBPM still remains stable thanks to the 
compensation mechanism of SBPM that can mitigate the effects caused by strategic nodes. The strategic user starts to 
send the bombast request at GOP 9 and before the time there is only one group of messages (normal request) in systems. 
The bombast message αbombast is not discounted and largely increases the value of d in bisection search algorithm. As the 
step 4 in the bisection search algorithm, the final price is not located in the initial interval, which depends on the price of 
last iteration. Hence, the search range is reset from 0 to a large value, such as 512, and then the number of iterations 
suddenly increases to 25. Once the group of bombast messages is established, the bombast messages can be detected and 
discounted to a reasonable value. The bisection search algorithm can find the final price in a few of iterations.   
In another case, the strategic user (SS1) exaggerates its bandwidth demands by different ratio in each iteration rather 
than in every GOP. This means that the strategic user in this case is much more inconsistent than the above case. Fig. 4(b) 
shows the average iteration count required for CBPM increases to 638. If the number of strategic users increases, CBPM 
will even never converge to a stable solution. CBPM will collapse when the inconsistency level of a strategic user 
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increases too much. The average iteration count required for of SBPM, however, still remains about 3.5. Because the 
exaggerative bandwidth demands are classified as bombast messages and the demands are recounted to appropriate 
levels. Consequently, the bombast messages do not influence the allocation process and the iteration count is still 
consistent. 
We also compare the performance of the bandwidth allocation (Fig. 5(a)) to each video flow and the PSNR quality 
(Fig. 5(b)) of received video. Joint uplink and downlink allocation is achieved by grafting the taxes on each user’s 
downlink quality. Note that flow indices 1~11 are uplink flows and indices 12~22 are downlink flows. In Fig. 5(a), SS1, 
SS6, and SS7 are strategic nodes. With the strategic behavior, we can find that the bandwidths allocated to flows 1, 6, and 
7 by CBPM are significantly higher than the normal case with no strategic node. As a result, the bandwidths allocated to 
other honest flows are lower than the normal case. The allocation using SBPM is not biased by the strategic behavior, 
since the SBPM can detect and adequately scale down the bombast demands of the strategic users. As shown in Fig. 5(b), 
since CBPM allocates higher rates to strategic nodes, the strategic nodes receive better quality video compared to the 
normal ones. The proposed SBPM avoids such unfairness and achieves better average PSNR quality. 
 
1 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Compasison of iteration counts with  User 1 is self
GOP index
Ite
ra
tio
n 
co
un
t
CBPM & no selfish node
CBPM & node 1 is selfish
SBPM & no selfish node
SBPM & node 1 is selfish
 
(a) 
1 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
x 104 Selfish in each iteration
GOP index
Ite
ra
tio
n 
co
un
t
CBPM & node 1 is selfish
SBPM & no selfish node
SBPM & node 1 is selfish
 
(b) 
Fig. 4. Comparison of iteration counts using CBPM and SBPM with a strategic node changing its bombast level at every 
(a) GOP, and (b) iteration. 
1 6 7 11 16 17 22
0.04
0.045
0.05
0.055
0.06
0.065
0.07
Comparison of bandwidth allocation
Flow index
B
an
dw
id
th
CBPM & no selfish node
CBPM & node 1,6,7 are selfish
SBPM & no selfish node
SBPM & node 1,6,7 are selfish
 
(a) 
Proc. of SPIE Vol. 7744  774413-9
Downloaded from SPIE Digital Library on 04 Feb 2012 to 140.114.195.186. Terms of Use:  http://spiedl.org/terms
  
1 6 7 11 16 17 22
25
30
35
40
45
50
Comparison of PSNR performance of video flows
Flow index
V
id
eo
 q
ua
lit
y 
(P
S
N
R
)
CBPM & no selfish node
CBPM & node 1,6,7 are selfish
SBPM & no selfish node
SBPM & node 1,6,7 are selfish
 
(b) 
Fig. 5. Comparison of (a) bandwidth allocation and (b) PSNR of video flows using CBPM and SBPM with three 
strategic nodes (SS1, SS6, and SS7). 
REFERENCES 
1. IEEE 802.16-2004, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Network | Part 16: Air Interface for Fixed 
Broadband Wireless Access Systems (2005). 
2. G.-M. Su, Z. Han, M. Wu, and K. J. Ray Liu, “A scalable multiuser framework for video over OFDM networks:    
Fairness and efficiency,” IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Technol., vol. 16, no. 10, pp. 1217–1231(2006). 
3. J. Huang, Z. Li, M. Chiang, and A. K. Katsaggelos, “Joint source adaptation and resource allocation for multi-user 
wireless video streaming,” IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Technol., vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 582–595 (2008). 
4. F. Kelly, A. Maulloo, and D. Tan, “Rate control for communication networks: Shadow prices, proportional fairness 
and stability,” Oper. Res. Soc., vol. 49, pp. 237–252 (1998). 
5. F. Fu, T. M. Stoenescu, and M. van der Schaar, “A pricing mechanism for resource allocation in wireless multimedia 
applications,” IEEE J. Select. Topics Signal Process, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 264–279 (2007). 
6. J. Chen et al., "The design and implementation of WiMAX module for ns-2 simulator," in Proc. ACM SESSION., 
vol. 202, no. 5 (2006). 
7. ITU-T and ISO/IEC JTC1, JVT-T202, Joint Scalable Video Model JSVM-7 (2006). 
8. NTHU WiMAX Video project. [Online]. Available: http://www.ee.nthu.edu.tw/cwlin/wimax_video/index.htm. 
9. R. C. Gonzalez , R. E. Woods, and S. L. Eddins, Digital Image Processing Using MATLAB, Prentice Hall (2003). 
10. B. Bradie, A Friendly Introduction to Numerical Analysis, Pearson Prentice Hall (2006). 
Proc. of SPIE Vol. 7744  774413-10
Downloaded from SPIE Digital Library on 04 Feb 2012 to 140.114.195.186. Terms of Use:  http://spiedl.org/terms
